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Abstract While we know that emotional reactions are important influences on
political behavior, we know far less about the sources of these emotions. This paper
studies the causes of fear and anger in reaction to a negative stimulus: the financial
crisis. Anger should have been experienced among individuals who believed a
specific actor was to blame for the crisis. Moreover, individuals should have been
particularly angry if they blamed an actor who should be accountable to them, for
example the national government. I test these expectations using a panel survey run
in Britain between 2005 and 2010. This data shows that British citizens experienced
anger if they held an actor responsible for the crisis. Moreover, they felt particularly
angry if they held the Labour government (and to a lesser extent the European
Union) responsible. These findings underline the importance of studying the causes
of emotional reactions and show how these may be linked to common institutional
distinctions between political systems.
Keywords Accountability  Anger  Blame assignment  Economic perceptions 
Emotional reactions  Fear
Introduction
The emotions we experience have important consequences for our political
behavior. Recent psychological and neuroscientific research has thus shown that our
emotional reactions can shape how we take decisions (Eagly and Chaiken 1993;
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Damasio 1994; Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001). Political psychologists have found
that emotions can affect how willing we are to re-evaluate our political beliefs and
become actively engaged in politics (Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Marcus et al.
2000; Rudolph et al. 2000; Brader 2005, 2006; Valentino et al. 2008, 2009; Huddy
et al. 2007; Groenendyk 2011).
Some of this research has investigated the impact on political behavior of discrete
emotions such as enthusiasm, anger, fear and sadness.1 For example, there is
evidence that how we react to negative stimuli and threatening situations depends in
part on whether they make us feel fear or anger (Huddy et al. 2005, 2007; Valentino
et al. 2008; MacKuen et al. 2010). The reasons for this may lie in the different
mental systems these emotions operate in (Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Cacioppo
et al. 1999; MacKuen et al. 2010; Weber 2012). While fear makes us more risk-
averse and vigilant (avoidance/surveillance systems), anger increases our readiness
to address the threat directly while relying on previously learned routines (approach/
disposition systems). For instance, some research has shown that it is anger rather
than fear that leads citizens to engage in protest behavior by taking part in
demonstrations or in other forms of political mobilization (van Zomeren et al. 2004;
Leach et al. 2006; Smith et al. 2008).
Yet, we know far less about the causes of these discrete emotions (Brader et al.
2010). What is it about the threatening situation or the negative stimulus that leads
some people to experience fear and others anger? Since these emotional reactions
may be central to determining our further behavior, it is important to understand
why these emotions arise in the first place. So far, political scientists and political
psychologists have however not paid much attention to exploring the sources of
discrete emotional reactions (though see Smith et al. 2008; Brader et al. 2010; and
Petersen et al. 2012).
In this paper, I develop two hypotheses that build on cognitive appraisal theories
of emotions, which suggest that the emotions we experience depend on our
assessment of the situation (Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Lazarus 1991; Smith et al.
2008). First, it is likely that our perception of whether someone is responsible for a
threat is a key determinant of whether we react to that threat with fear or anger.
Specifically, anger is the more likely emotional reaction if the threat has an
identifiable external cause.
Yet, blaming an actor on its own may not be enough to explain why someone reacts
with anger instead of fear: instead, it may matter what kind of actor is blamed. My
second hypothesis is therefore that anger is more likely than fear among individuals
who believe that the actor responsible should be under their control and should care
about their welfare. This means that reacting with anger should be more likely if there is
an accountability relationship between the individual and the actor blamed (e.g. Smith
and Ellsworth 1985; Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001; Smith et al. 2008; Sell et al. 2009).
I test these hypotheses using emotional reactions to the financial crisis in the UK
as measured in a 2005–2010 panel survey. The financial crisis is an event that
presented an important economic threat to both individual citizens and the country
as a whole. Both fear and anger are appropriate responses to the financial crisis: fear
1 In this paper, fear and anxiety are treated as synonymous terms.
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about the potential impact of the economic downturn, anger at the actions that made
the crisis possible. Moreover, the survey evidence shows that people varied in their
assignment of responsibility for the crisis. While some did assign blame, others
were more uncertain about its causes or believed that the crisis ‘just happened’.
Among those citizens who did hold specific actors responsible, there was also
variation in who was blamed. Many blamed banks and financial institutions in the
UK and abroad, but others also saw the national government, the European Union
(EU) or other countries as responsible.
In this paper, I show that these variations help to account for why some British
citizens were angry and others afraid in reaction to the financial crisis. Specifically, I
present evidence that citizens who held an actor responsible for the crisis were more
likely to be angry. In addition, citizens were particularly likely to be angry if they
held the national government and (to a lesser extent) the EU responsible for the
crisis. I argue that this is because citizens believe that these two actors should be
under their control and should care about their welfare. In other words, anger is
more likely to arise when an accountability relationship is perceived to be broken or
violated. These findings are particularly robust given that the availability of panel
data means that I can control tightly for emotional and partisan predispositions.
Whether and to whom voters assign blame for the economic situation is
important in explaining emotional reactions. This finding significantly advances our
understanding of the origins of emotions in politics. Moreover, anger and fear differ
in their consequences: I thus show in a concluding analysis that experiencing anger
(but not fear) led previous Labour voters to reconsider their vote choice in 2010.
This is consistent with the theory that anger activates the approach rather than the
avoidance system. Overall, this paper underlines the importance of principal-agent
relationships and accountability in analyzing the role of the economy in political
behavior. Perceptions of responsibility and control have been central to under-
standing the impact of economic perceptions on vote choice, and the evidence
presented here provides further evidence of their importance in explaining how
voters react to economic conditions (on perceptions of responsibility, see, e.g.,
Rudolph 2003; Hellwig et al. 2008; Marsh and Tilley 2010; Hellwig and Coffey
2011; Hobolt et al. 2013; on the extent of control, see, e.g., Powell and Whitten
1993; Anderson 2000, 2007; Johns 2011).
This paper is structured as follows. I begin by reviewing the differences between
fear and anger as discrete emotional reactions and then consider how voters’
emotions may have been shaped by their assessment of responsibility for the
financial crisis. I then describe the data, measurement approach and modeling
strategy before presenting the results. I conclude by highlighting implications of my
findings for understanding emotional reactions to politics in general.
Fear and Anger as Discrete Emotional Responses
Much existing work on the role of voters’ emotions in politics has made use of the
two-dimensional valence model of emotions (Marcus et al. 2000; Marcus 2003).
This model suggests that positive and negative emotions are arranged on two
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separate and orthogonal dimensions. This means that positive and negative emotions
can co-occur (Cassese and Weber 2011). Neuroscientific research has shown that
these positive and negative emotions each affect decision-making (Damasio 1994;
Marcus et al. 2000; Valentino et al. 2011; Cassese and Weber 2011). In particular,
negative emotions lead to us to try to avoid harm and danger (‘avoidance’), while
positive emotions foster reward-seeking and engagement (‘approach’; Gray 1990;
Cacioppo et al. 1999; Huddy et al. 2007; Valentino et al. 2011).
In political science, the most prominent use of the two-dimensional model of
emotions is as part of the affective intelligence theory (Marcus et al. 2000), which
argues that emotions help to determine when we rely on heuristics and when we take
decisions more cautiously (though see Ladd and Lenz 2008, 2011). Specifically,
positive emotions such as enthusiasm activate the disposition system and reinforce
existing behaviors and attitudes. In contrast, negative emotions such as anxiety
activate the surveillance system and lead individuals to rely less on habit. Instead,
negative emotions are argued to increase information-seeking and careful decision-
making. In this approach, fear and anger have generally been treated as part of one
underlying dimension containing negative emotions (Marcus and MacKuen 1993;
Marcus et al. 2000; Rudolph et al. 2000).2
However, more recently the two-dimensional valence model has been criticized
as overly simplistic (e.g. Petersen 2010; Huddy et al. 2007; Valentino et al. 2008,
2011; Smith et al. 2008; Weber 2012; see also Conover and Feldman 1986).
Researchers have asked whether a focus on positive and negative emotions fails to
account for differences between emotions of the same valence (Cassese and Weber
2011). In particular, it has been questioned whether anger and fear should both be
seen as similar, negative emotions. Rather, it is argued that these two emotions
should be considered as discrete responses because they are caused by different
situational appraisals and because they have different consequences for our behavior
(Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Conover and Feldman 1986; Lerner and Keltner 2000,
2001; Huddy et al. 2007; Carver and Harmon-Jones 2009; Petersen 2010; Valentino
et al. 2011; Marcus 2013, p. 119).
First, fear and anger may lead us to engage in different kinds of further behavior.
While most versions of affective intelligence theory argue that both emotions trigger
the surveillance system (Marcus et al. 2000), more recent research indicates that the
effects of fear and anger may differ. There is thus some evidence that anxiety leads
to problem-focused information-seeking, risk-averse behavior and increased
vigilance, while anger increases risk-seeking behavior and the motivation to engage
in political action (Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001; Druckman and McDermott 2008;
Carver and Harmon-Jones 2009; Valentino et al. 2009, 2011; Brader et al. 2010; see
also MacKuen et al. 2010 for a similar account using AIT theory). As Smith et al.
(2008, p. 223) state, ‘anger motivates people to attack and remove the source of
action,… and fear motivates people to be cautious and avoid harm’.3
2 One important exception is MacKuen et al. (2010), who argue that aversion, which includes anger and
disgust, activates the disposition system, just like positive emotions.
3 In their summary of recent research on the consequences of fear and anger, Valentino et al. (2008,
p. 249) however note that while the finding that anger mobilizes action is clear and strong, the
consequences of fear may be more variable.
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Fear and anger also differ in how they are caused. The main insights into the
different origins of fear and anger come from cognitive appraisal theories of
emotions (Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Lazarus 1991; Smith et al. 2008; Carver and
Harmon-Jones 2009; Cassese and Weber 2011; Valentino et al. 2011). These
theories suggest that our emotional responses arise as a consequence of how we
understand and interpret the situation we experience. As Best and Krueger (2011,
p. 89) note: ‘Because people often appraise the same situation differently, cognitive
appraisal theory helps comprehend why people experiencing the same phenomena
or event may exhibit different emotions of the same valence.’ The focus of such
theories is therefore on the cognitive appraisals that generate specific emotions.4
Whether a threat leads to fear or to anger therefore depends on how a threat is
perceived and assessed. In the next section, I will consider how these appraisals may
have shaped emotional reactions to the financial crisis.
Fear and Anger as Emotional Responses to the Financial Crisis
The financial crisis since 2007 is likely to have been seen as both a personal and
national threat to many people. As a negative stimulus, it will have led to strong
emotional responses (‘affective appraisals’), including anger and fear (MacKuen
et al. 2010). However, when did the financial crisis cause anger and when did it
inspire fear? In line with discrete models of emotion, it is likely that the nature of
individuals’ appraisal of the situation was an important determinant of their
emotional reactions. Appraisal theories identify a wide variety of important factors,
including among others the certainty and legitimacy of the outcome and the
relevance of the event (Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Cassese and Weber 2011).
How does Assigning Responsibility Affect Emotional Reactions?
Concerning the financial crisis, one aspect should be particularly important: the
assignment of responsibility. Our emotional response to a threat can depend on
whether we attribute blame for that threat to an actor, that is, whether we believe that
another actor is responsible for the negative stimulus (Lerner and Tiedens 2006).5 In
such cases, anger is the likely emotional response (Weiner 1985; Smith and
Ellsworth 1985; Conover and Feldman 1986; Frijda 1986; Lazarus and Lazarus
1994; Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones 2004; Lerner and Tiedens 2006; Smith et al.
2008). Lerner and Keltner (2000, p. 479) thus note that individuals react with anger
4 This fits with the way political science researchers measure emotional responses, namely by asking
participants in surveys and experiments to report their emotional reactions (Valentino et al. 2011). This
means that the emotions political scientists generally tend to study are emotions that are consciously
experienced and are reported after some level of individual self-examination.
5 It is worth noting that the link between blame and anger is not undisputed. For example, Berkowitz and
Harmon-Jones (2004, p. 117) write that ‘[t]he anger evoked by the aversive state of affairs could at times
seem unreasonable to those affected and thereby provoke a search for some external source to blame,…
perhaps in an attempt to justify the feelings, ideas, and impulses that are experienced.’ A similar argument
is made by Frijda (1993). At the very least, there may be a reciprocal relationship between blame and
anger.
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when they think that the situation was ‘brought about by others’ and is ‘under human
control’ (see also Brader et al. 2010; Petersen et al. 2012). Smith and Ellsworth
(1985) term these aspects of situation ‘other-control’ and ‘other-responsibility’.
Thus, anger is caused by events that are the result of actions by an external actor, not
by one’s own actions (‘self-control’) or simply the result of fate, luck or circumstance
(‘situational control’).6
In contrast, fear is the more likely reaction when the situation cannot be blamed
on any specific actor (Lerner and Keltner 2000; though see Smith et al. 2008). As
Lerner and Tiedens (2006, p. 117) write, ‘when people feel uncertain or lack
confidence about the cause of negative events, they are likely to feel fear and
anxiety rather than anger.’7 In other words, fear can be seen as a ‘default’ response
to a threat that is maintained if no external source for that threat can be identified.
We know that voters vary in whether they assign responsibility for economic
outcomes to various actors. While certainly not an easy task, citizens can and do
regularly identify actors responsible for economic developments (e.g., Powell and
Whitten 1993; Anderson 2000, 2007; Rudolph and Grant 2002; Rudolph 2003;
Marsh and Tilley 2010). The nature of the emotional response to the financial crisis
should depend in part on whether an individual believed a specific actor was
responsible. The first hypothesis is thus that individuals should experience anger
rather than fear if they blame an actor for the financial crisis.
Accountability Relationships and Anger
The expectation above is simple: assigning blame for a threat leads to increased
anger compared to fear. Yet cognitive appraisal theories also indicate that the
relationship between blame and emotional reactions may be more nuanced than this.
It may matter what kind of actor we assign blame to, or more specifically whether
there is a principal-agent relationship with that actor. Anger rather than fear should
be more likely if this is the case. This is because individuals will be more likely to
react with anger if they believe the threat to be caused by an external actor who (1)
they should have control over but who (2) has paid insufficient regard to their
welfare. I will address these two points in turn.
First, it has been established that anger is more likely if individuals themselves
believe that they have some control over remedying the situation (Smith and
Ellsworth 1985; Lazarus and Lazarus 1994; Lerner and Keltner 2001; Smith et al.
2008; Valentino et al. 2009). If they do believe this, then anger is a more likely
reaction than fear. This appraisal is what Smith and Ellsworth (1985) refer to as
‘self-control’ and ‘self-responsibility’: the extent to which the individuals
themselves believe that they have control over and responsibility for the events.8
6 In a different context and based on evolutionary psychology, Petersen et al. (2012) show that anger
towards welfare recipients depends on whether they are seen as responsible for their own poverty, e.g.
because they lack motivation to work.
7 They add that sadness is caused when we blame general ‘situational’ events for the threat and shame/
guilt when we blame ourselves for the event.
8 See Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones (2004, p. 116) for arguments against the importance of coping
potential as a cause of anger.
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Smith et al. (2008) note that other work uses similar terms such as control potential
(Roseman et al. 1990), controllability (Frijda et al. 1989) or coping potential
(Lazarus 2001). In political science, this has usually been termed political efficacy
(Easton 1965; Easton and Dennis 1967; Balch 1974; Niemi et al. 1991).9 When the
perception of efficacy is low, fear is the likely emotional reaction, while higher
levels are associated with anger (Lerner and Keltner 2001). Thus, Valentino et al.
(2009, p. 310) note that ‘[f]ear occurs when…the situation appears to be outside the
individual’s control, while anger is more likely when the individual perceives
herself to be in control of the causal agent.’ We are likely to react with anger when
we think that we can control the external actor behind the threat, but with fear if
addressing a threat by an actor of whom we are not the principal.
However, the key point that causes anger in politics may be that the agent over
whom we nominally have control has not acted in ways that benefit us. Recent
research in evolutionary psychology has argued that anger arises when ‘the other
party is not placing ‘‘sufficient’’ weight on [our] welfare’ (Sell et al. 2009,
p. 15074). This may particularly be the case when we have some control over the
actor, since that leads us to expect benefits in return. This means that anger rather
than fear may be the result of situations where we are disappointed about an actor
who should be caring more about our welfare. In related work, anger has been seen
to be caused when individuals believe an action to be illegitimate or improper
(Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones 2004): ‘An angering event is one in which someone
or something challenges what ‘ought’ to happen’ (Frijda 1986, p. 199; see also
Petersen et al. 2012). Importantly, Roseman et al. (1996) argue that the perception
of illegitimacy needs to be coupled with control potential to lead to anger. The
question is not whether individuals have actual control over the external actor, but
whether they believe they should have such control. In sum, angry emotional
reactions may arise in particular when voters blame an actor with whom the
principal-agent relationship is malfunctioning.
With regard to the financial crisis (and the economy in general), citizens can be
said to be the principals of their national government, for example through elections
(Mu¨ller 2000). At the very least, they are likely to hold the normative belief that
these actors should be their agents and thus accountable to them. This institution-
alized principal-agent relationship stands in contrast to the weak (or even non-
existent) accountability ties that link citizens to other economic actors such as
businesses, banks and foreign countries. Concerning the European Union, there is a
weaker link between citizens and the EU’s political institutions. Nevertheless,
though the chain of accountability is less direct, the EU is also under clearer citizen
control than, say, banks or mortgage companies; at the very least, voters may expect
the EU to be more responsive to citizen concerns.
Importantly, citizens are likely to have varied in whom they held responsible for
the financial crisis. While some will have blamed banks and mortgage companies,
9 The concept of self-control does not clearly relate to either internal or external efficacy. Internal
efficacy is the extent to which an individual considers herself to be competent to understand and
participate in politics, external efficacy the extent an individual considers the government to be
responsive to citizen demands (Niemi et al. 1991). A perception of control over actors arguably requires
both types of efficacy.
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others may have held governments responsible as well. In general, voters vary in
who they believe has the most influence on economic outcomes. For example, they
differ in they extent they see the government as responsible for the economy
(Powell and Whitten 1993; Anderson 2000, 2007; Rudolph 2003). For example, in
the 2005 BES pre-election survey, 25 % of respondents said that the government
influences the performance of the economy ‘a great deal’, 54 % ‘a fair amount’,
11 % ‘not very much’ or ‘not at all’, with 9 % ticking ‘don’t know’.10 It is likely
that this also applies to other actors with potential influence on the economy such as
the European Union, banks, businesses and foreign countries and governments.
In sum, in the context of the financial crisis citizens should be angry rather than
afraid if they blame the national government (and to a lesser extent the EU) for the
threat, and they should be afraid rather than angry if they see the threat’s cause as
associated with actors outside of clear principal-agent relationships such as banks or
foreign governments.11 My second hypothesis is therefore that individuals should be
more likely to experience anger rather than fear if they blame the national
government or the EU for the financial crisis than if they blame other actors.
Measuring Fear and Anger Using the BES Internet Panel
I study voters’ emotional reactions to the financial crisis in Great Britain using data
from a 6-year internet panel survey carried out by the British Election Study (2010).
This survey had nine waves, three each in the two election years (2005 and 2010)
and one each in 2006, 2008 and 2009. The waves used in this paper are shown in
Table 1. Sanders et al. (2007, 2011) show that the sample used by the BES internet
panel is very similar to that of a representative in-person sample. Identical models of
vote choice run with the in-person and internet surveys also yield almost identical
model parameters (Sanders et al. 2007).
I construct my measure of emotional reactions to the financial crisis based on a
question asked in the pre-election survey 2010 (wave 7). This survey asked two
questions about respondents’ feelings about the economy: ‘Which, if any, of the
following words describe your feelings about the country’s general economic
situation?’ and ‘Which, if any, of the following words describe your feelings about
how you have been personally affected by the current financial crisis?’. The
respondents were given eight emotions to choose from: angry, happy, disgusted,
hopeful, uneasy, confident, afraid and proud. They could also select ‘no feelings’ or
‘don’t know’. Of these eight emotions, respondents were allowed to choose up to
four. I treat ‘angry’ as the indicator of anger and ‘afraid’ and ‘uneasy’ as indicators
of fear.
10 Weighted using YouGov’s non-political weight. The distribution of responses is similar if we use the
same question asked in the 2010 survey and if we use the 2005 question asking about government
influence on one’s personal financial situation.
11 Unfortunately, the BES questionnaire does not contain items that measure the extent to which
individuals see situational causes as responsible for the crisis (e.g. globalization, capitalism or greed).
Cognitive appraisal theories would predict that perceptions of situational control should lead to increased
fear relative to anger.
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My main dependent variable is the proportion of ‘anger’ relative to the total
number of angry and fearful emotions selected by the respondent.12 This variable
ranges from 0 to 1. Around 8 % of respondents selected neither angry nor fearful
emotions. These respondents were coded as having a proportion of 0 angry
emotions, but the statistical results do not change if this group of respondents is
omitted (see supplemental material). In the analysis below, I do not take into
account the total number of angry and fearful emotions selected; additional analyses
presented in the supplemental materials show that the substance of the findings does
not differ depending on the total number of these emotions selected by the
respondents.
Figure 1 presents a histogram of angry and fearful emotional reactions to the
economy and the financial crisis in Britain in 2010. A little more than a third of
respondents do not select anger at all. For about a quarter of respondents, anger
makes up 50 % or more of the angry and fearful emotions selected. The remaining
group of respondents, making up more than a third of the total, can be classified as
slightly angry: while they do select that emotion, they do so less often than fearful
emotions.
Measures of Blame Assignment and Control Variables
Before analyzing the causes of anger and fear as emotional reactions to the financial
crisis, I describe the model set-up, including the additional controls needed. First,
the key predictor variables of fear and anger concern the responsibility of other
actors for the financial crisis. One key advantage of using panel data is that I can
measure perceptions of responsibility and emotional reactions in separate waves.
These are taken from an earlier wave than the emotion measure in order to reduce
the problem known as simultaneity in survey response, i.e. that survey participants
Table 1 BES internet panel
Wave Date Respondents Questions
1 March/April 2005 7793 Emotional predispositions
3 May 2005 5910 Vote choice





6 July 2009 4,048 Assignment of responsibility
7 March/April 2010 3,402 Emotional reactions
9 May 2010 2,781 Vote choice
12 ‘Disgust’, the final negative emotion that respondents could select, is left out of the analysis. While
potentially related to anger (Marcus et al. 2000; MacKuen et al. 2010), many researchers now separate
these two emotions (e.g. Vandenbroek 2011; Banks and Valentino 2012).
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try to remain consistent in their responses within one survey (Abelson 1968;
Schwarz and Sudman 1992). Specifically, I use a question from wave 6 (July 2009)
that measures blame assignment directly. Respondents were asked: ‘Who do you
think is responsible for the current financial crisis?’ and were then asked to choose
as many actors as they wished out of a list of eleven options. The answers ‘Gordon
Brown’ and ‘the British government’ were coded as blaming the Labour
government. Further indicators for responsibility are (1) international financiers
and banks (both British and American), (2) American actors (George W. Bush,
Barack Obama and the American government), (3) the European Union, (4) people
with big mortgages or (5) no one, also including ‘don’t knows’.
The responses to this question in 2009 are shown in Table 2. As multiple
selections were possible, the column entries add up to more than 100 %. Almost all
respondents (86.6 %) hold national or international banks responsible for the crisis.
About half of respondents believe that the US and British governments hold some
responsibility, while only 20 % see the EU as responsible for the crisis. (Recall that
this survey was carried out in July 2009, so before the crisis began to center on
Greece, Italy and Spain.) 9 % of respondents selected ‘don’t know’ or ‘no actor
responsible’ as their reply to this question.
I have suggested that blaming the national government and the EU leads to anger
more than blaming other actors due to the existence of a principal-agent
relationship, which in turn creates the possibility that individuals will believe that
they have coping potential and that the actor blamed has acted improperly in
neglecting their welfare. Unfortunately, the presence of these two perceptions
(coping potential and disregard for welfare) cannot be tested directly using the data
 
Note: Data from wave 7 (March/April 2010) of the BES internet panel 2005-2010. Respondents 
who select neither ‘anger’ nor ‘fear’ coded as 0. Number of respondents shown above bars. For 
further coding details, see text. 
Fig. 1 Emotional reactions to the financial crisis, 2010
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available. For one, the survey does not include measures that assess whether
respondents think that governments should be responsive (rather than whether they
are responsive). I do control for general efficacy using a measure from the 2006
wave that asked respondents to rate their influence on politics on a scale of 0–10.13
Yet this overall measure of efficacy does not capture whether respondents believe
they should have influence over politics, and it is precisely this frustration and
discrepancy that should lead to anger (Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones 2004). In
addition, disregard for welfare is not measured either: there are no items that ask
whether governments have a duty to care for their citizens or whether this duty has
been violated during the crisis.
In the model, I also control for further factors that may be important influences on
both emotional reactions to the financial crisis and on assignments of responsibility.
Another advantage of the panel data is that I can measure these important
confounders before the crisis occurred. First, I control for emotional predispositions
towards anger and fear. To do so, I include a variable from wave 1 (March/April
2005) that measures the proportion of anger about the economy relative to the total
number of angry and fearful emotions. This variable has three possible values: 0, 0.5
and 1. Respondents who were neither angry nor fearful are coded as 0. I also include
a further variable from wave 1 that measures the proportion of anger about two
unrelated matters, namely the National Health Service and the Iraq war. This index
also ranges from 0 to 1 and has eight possible values. Overall, these two variables
control for any factors that generally influence why people say they are angry rather
than fearful about the economy or general political topics.
I also control for partisan affect. It is very important to control tightly for this
given its strong influence on emotional reactions (Ladd and Lenz 2008, 2011), on
perceptions of the economy (e.g. Gerber and Huber 2010) and on survey response
overall (Rahn et al. 1994). I control for partisan affect by including indicators for
party identification with the three main parties and for general affect for them, as
measured in the last pre-crisis wave. Party identification is thus coded 1 for Labour,
Conservative and Liberal Democrat identifiers respectively in wave 4 (May 2006),
Table 2 Assignments of
responsibility for the financial
crisis, 2009
Note Multiple answers possible.
Data from wave 6 (July 2009) of
the BES internet panel
2005–2010. Unweighted results
shown. For coding details, see
text
Actors responsible n in %
Banks 3,499 86.6
National government 1,929 47.8
US government 1,791 44.3
Mortgage holders 1,142 28.3
European Union 818 20.3
Don’t know/no one 365 9.0
Total 4,040
13 The question text is: ‘On a scale from 0 to 10, where 10 means a great deal of influence and 0 means
no influence, how much influence do you have on politics and public affairs?’.
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0 otherwise.14 Those with a different or no party identification are used as the
reference category. General affect is measured using the 0–10 like-dislike score for
the three parties, also from wave 4 (May 2006), with higher values indicating more
positive evaluations.15
I also control for economic ideology, measured as respondents’ preferences on
cutting taxes or spending more on public services on a 0–10 scale. Left-wing
respondents may be more likely to be angry about the crisis: ideologically, they may
react more negatively towards financial institutions than right-wing voters. Since
left–right economic ideology may also color opinions on responsibility for and
handling of the crisis (Anderson 2007), it is important to control for this factor.16
Finally, I control for attention to politics in 2006 as panel attrition might be higher
among respondents with lower levels of political interest.17
Results
I model the dependent variable using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression; results
using ordinal logistic regression lead to substantively identical results (see supple-
mental information). I present eight models (Tables 3, 4). The first four test the first
hypothesis, so whether responsibility attributions increase anger relative to fear, first
without control variables (Model 1) and then with different sets of attitudinal controls
(Models 2–4). The second four models test the second hypothesis, so whether anger is
more likely if the national government is blamed rather than other external actors,
again without (Model 5) and with the various controls (Models 6–8). Below, I discuss
results mainly from Models 3 and 7, which include the main attitudinal and partisan
controls, but the results are consistent across models.
Before we turn to the results relevant to the two hypotheses, I briefly describe the
effects of the control variables, which mostly have the expected effects and are
consistent across models. Thus, emotional predispositions are very influential: those
voters who felt angrier about either the economy or Iraq and the NHS in 2005 are
also more likely to feel angry about the financial crisis in 2010. Party identification
with Labour reduces anger. The same pattern also holds if we control for general
party affect (Model 4). These results are consistent with a partisan impact on
emotional reactions (Ladd and Lenz 2008, 2011): since ‘their’ government was in
charge, Labour supporters may have been less likely to experience anger. The more
right-wing voters are in terms of economic ideology, the more likely they are to feel
angry about the financial crisis; this goes against the prediction based on ideology,
14 Wave 4 answers used because the party identification questions were not asked in the standard format
in wave 1. The question text from wave 4 is: ‘Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Labour,
Conservative, Liberal Democrat or what?’.
15 The question text is: ‘On a scale that runs from 0 to 10, where 0 means strongly dislike and 10 means
strongly like, how to you feel about the Labour Party?’.
16 0 means that ‘government should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social services’,
and 10 that ‘government should raise taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services’. The
coding of this variable was reversed in the analysis.
17 The question text is: ‘On a scale of 0–10, how much attention do you generally pay to politics?’.
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but fits with the impact of party affect. It may be that this item captures opposition
to the fact that the crisis led to increased budget deficits and tax increases without
cutting social spending. Finally, higher levels of attention to politics increase the
probability of feeling angry compared to feeling afraid, while political efficacy has a
weak but significant effect on the nature of negative emotional reactions.18
Table 3 Assignment of responsibility and emotional reactions (1)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
















0.140*** (0.020) 0.122*** (0.020) 0.093*** (0.020)
Left–right economic
ideology, 2006
0.019*** (0.003) 0.013*** (0.003) 0.010*** (0.003)
Attention to politics,
2006
0.010*** (0.003) 0.011*** (0.003) 0.009** (0.003)
Political efficacy,
2006
-0.007** (0.003) -0.006* (0.003) -0.004 (0.003)
Party identification,
2006
Labour -0.075*** (0.014) -0.022 (0.017)
Conservative 0.025 (0.015) -0.004 (0.018)




Liberal democrat -0.003 (0.003)
Constant 0.192*** (0.023) 0.029 (0.030) 0.085** (0.031) 0.162*** (0.038)
Observations 2,530 2,298 2,298 2,241
R2 0.007 0.087 0.105 0.119
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.084 0.102 0.114
Note The dependent variable is the proportion of ‘anger’ relative to the total number of angry and fearful
emotions selected by the respondent (range: 0–1). Respondents selecting neither angry nor fearful
emotions coded as 0. Standard errors in parentheses. * p \ 0.05, ** p \ 0.01, *** p \ 0.001. Data from
BES internet panel 2005–2010. For coding details of the predictor variables, see text
18 This weak effect can be explained by the decision to include respondents without any emotion in the
model; models excluding these respondents show no significant effect of political efficacy (see
supplemental information).
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Table 4 Assignment of responsibility and emotional reactions (2)
































0.037* (0.015) 0.039** (0.015)










0.109*** (0.031) 0.090** (0.031)









0.011*** (0.003) 0.009** (0.003)
Attention to politics, 2006 0.008**
(0.003)
0.009** (0.003) 0.008** (0.003)
Political efficacy, 2006 -0.005
(0.003)





Conservative 0.016 (0.015) -0.001 (0.018)









0.148*** (0.038) 0.206*** (0.044)
Observations 2,530 2,298 2,298 2,241
R2 0.080 0.126 0.133 0.140
Adjusted R2 0.078 0.122 0.128 0.133
Note The dependent variable is the proportion of ‘anger’ relative to the total number of angry and fearful
emotions selected by the respondent (range: 0–1). Respondents selecting neither angry nor fearful
emotions coded as 0. Standard errors in parentheses. * p \ 0.05, ** p \ 0.01, *** p \ 0.001. Data from
BES internet panel 2005–2010. For coding details of the predictor variables, see text
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I begin with the first hypothesis, which states that citizens are more likely to feel
anger if they blame an external actor. The key variable here is whether respondents
chose one or more of the actors on the list of potential actors responsible; in other
words, they did not answer ‘no one’ or ‘don’t know’. Models 1–4 show that people
who blamed an actor were more likely to be angry compared to those respondents
who did not.19 The increase in the proportion of anger relative to all anger/fear
mentions is about 0.07. The effect is significant at the 0.05 level in all models. The
effect is also of very similar magnitude to that of identifying with Labour and larger
than that of economic ideology and attention to politics. There is thus support for the
hypothesis that a substantively important predictor of anger about the crisis is
whether an actor was seen as responsible for it.
The second hypothesis argued that the effect of blame assignment may be more
nuanced, in that it matters whom citizens assign blame to. This hypothesis is tested
in Models 5–8 (Table 4), where our main attention should be on the different
responsibility indicators.
The results provide strong support for the hypothesis. Voters who believe that the
UK government was one of the actors responsible for the financial crisis are more
likely to be angry. The proportion of anger relative to all anger/fear mentions
increases by 0.09 on the 0–1 scale. This effect is significant at the 0.001 level and
substantively large compared to those of party identification, ideology and attention
to politics. Blaming the EU also increases the proportion of anger relative to all
anger/fear mentions; at 0.04 (p \ 0.05), this effect is smaller than that of blaming
the national government (Wald test, p \ 0.05). The coefficient for blaming banks is
negative but only significant in models without controls.
In sum, holding the UK government responsible has a large effect on the
proportion of anger within anger and fear, while blaming the EU has a smaller, but
still significant effect. Together with the fact that blaming banks has no significant
effect, this pattern of results indicates that an accountability relationship appears to
be necessary for blame to result in anger. Finally, the reasons why blaming banks
and not blaming an actor at all fail to lead to anger are different: in the former case,
the reason is a lack of an accountability relationship, while in the latter case the
reason is the failure to identify an external cause for the threat.
The Consequences of Emotional Reactions
Anger should activate the approach system and lead individuals to attempt to
remove the source of harm, while fear should activate the avoidance system and
lead to risk-averse behavior. This expectation can be applied to vote choice after the
financial crisis. The default decision of British citizens who voted Labour in 2005
might be to vote Labour again in 2010. However, anger about the financial crisis
might lead such voters to re-evaluate their standing decision and try to remove
Labour government, i.e. the source of the threat. In contrast, fear might lead voters
19 Note that respondents expressing neither anger nor fear are coded as 0. The results do not change
substantively if these respondents are excluded (see supplemental material).
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to stick with their standing decision.20 So, I expect Labour voters in 2005 who are
angry about the financial crisis to be less likely to vote Labour again in 2010. In
contrast, Labour voters in 2010 who are fearful about the crisis should be likely to
vote Labour again.
I test this using a binary logistic regression model (Table 5). The sample in
Models 9 and 10 is restricted to Labour voters in 2005 who also voted in 2010. The
dependent variable is measured as 1 if the respondent voted for Labour again in
2010, 0 if he/she voted for another party. Anger is measured as the number of times
the respondent selected ‘angry’ as an emotion regarding the economy and the
financial crisis; this variable ranges from 0 to 2. Fear is measured as the number of
times the respondent selected ‘afraid’ and ‘uneasy’ as an emotion regarding the
economy and the financial crisis; this variable ranges from 0 to 4. Model 9 shows
the results of a simple model, while Model 10 adds key controls for emotional
predispositions, partisan leanings and economic evaluations (see supplemental
information for coding details).
Based on Model 9, we can calculate that previous Labour supporters were about
14 % less likely to vote for Labour in 2010 if they were very angry about the
economy rather than not angry at all.21 This effect is significant at the .05 level, and
it is also substantively large: to compare, the effect of identifying with Labour in
2005 increases the probability of voting for Labour again in 2010 by 27 %.
Models 11 and 12 show that the effect of anger was restricted to Labour voters.
These models use the full sample of 2005 voters; the dependent variable is 1 if the
respondent voted for the same party as in 2005, 0 if not. Emotional reactions are
interacted with having voted Labour in 2005. The negative statistical significance of
the interaction term along with the absence of an effect among other voters shows
that anger led to a change in behavior specifically among previous Labour voters.
Discussion and Conclusion
When are voters angry in reaction to the economic situation, and when are they
afraid? In this paper, I have argued that citizens respond with anger when they hold
an external actor responsible for the crisis. Moreover, anger is particularly likely
when individuals see the actor responsible as their agent. Individuals are more likely
to get angry if they think the threat arose due to the actions of an agent who should
have placed greater weight on their welfare. These two hypotheses held in the case
of the financial crisis: voters were angrier when they assigned blame for the crisis,
but anger was increased only when they blamed the national government and, to a
lesser extent, the EU.
These findings are important because understanding how citizens vary in how
they interpret and appraise negative events helps us explain why their political
20 Looking at turnout is not possible using the panel data due to the very low number of respondents
reporting abstention in 2010.
21 These predicted probabilities are calculated using the observed-values approach suggested in Hanmer
and Ozan Kalkan (2012).
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reactions to these events differ (MacKuen et al. 2010). There has been a lot of recent
work examining how variation in emotional reactions leads to differences in
political behavior, for example in terms of vote choice, political attitudes,
participation and learning (Weber 2012). However, a full picture of the importance
of emotions in politics also requires an understanding of the determinants of these
emotional reactions. This paper shows that the nature of blame assignment has a
strong influence on emotional reactions.
Table 5 Emotional reactions and vote choice
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12



















Voted labour in 2005 0.298 (0.213) -0.612*
(0.266)




















Anger mentions, NHS and Iraq,
2005 (0–2)
0.355 (0.194) 0.170 (0.100)








































Observations 516 476 1,678 1,425
Note The dependent variable is 1 if the respondent voted for the same party in 2005 and 2010, 0 if not.
Standard errors in parentheses. * p \ 0.05, ** p \ 0.01, *** p \ 0.001. Data from BES internet panel
2005–2010. For coding details of the predictor variables, see text
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Finally, it is important to note important limitations of the present findings; these
also present potential ways of extending this research. First, it was not possible to
test the specific causal mechanism why individuals were angry about the economy
when they blamed their political agents. It was suggested that the likely cause is a
perception that the actor should be under the individual’s control but that has paid
insufficient attention to the individual’s welfare. Due to the lack of suitable survey
measures in the British Election Study, the accuracy of this suggested mechanism
cannot be definitively confirmed here.
Second, this paper has argued that the causal arrow between anger and blame is
in the following direction: a threat to an individual arises; the individual decides
whether or not to assign blame for that threat to an actor; this appraisal of the
situation leads the individual to experience certain emotions, including anger and
fear. However, it may also be that angry individuals seek to assign blame (Frijda
1993; Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones 2004), and that such people may decide to
blame in particular those actors whose principal they are. Existing research in
psychology has not been able to disentangle these two plausible causal stories, and
providing a clearer causal account should be a task for future research.
Third, this research has highlighted the importance of distinguishing between
fear and anger. However, other negative emotions exist as well. In particular,
disgust has been shown to have political importance (e.g. Vandenbroek 2011; Banks
and Valentino 2012), and its origins also deserve to be studied.
Finally, future work should engage in a comparative effort. Blame assignments
are strongly shaped by institutional arrangements. For example, voters may be more
willing to attribute responsibility for economic outcomes to the government where
there is ‘clarity of responsibility’ (Powell and Whitten 1993; Anderson 2000), both at
the national level and across other levels of governance. Whether there is clarity of
responsibility depends partly on the institutional structure of the state; for example,
electoral systems affect the existence of clear alternatives in a party system (Powell
and Vanberg 2000). This may also mean that anger in reaction to negative economic
events is also greater in systems with higher clarity of responsibility. As a result, how
emotional reactions to political events differ across countries may depend on quite
familiar concepts and institutions related to citizen control. These emotions may then
play an important role in determining how the economy influences political behavior.
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